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I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose that a ten-million-dollar development project in Levy County
was suddenly stymied by the discovery of a nest of Florida salt marsh
voles.' Such a delay could endanger a project bringing much-needed jobs

* J.D. anticipated 2006, University of Florida Levin College ofLaw; B.A. in History, Duke
University, 2002. This Note is dedicated to my parents, James and Diana Shuler, and to my sister
Katie.
** Editor'sNote: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note in Spring 2005.
1. The Florida salt marsh vole is a listed endangered species; currently, the species resides
only in one population cluster on private land in Levy County. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Recovery Plan for the Florida Salt Marsh Vole 1-4 (1997), http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/
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to one of Florida's poorest counties.2 Despite existing in only one county
in one state, this newly discovered nest of Florida salt marsh voles would
receive the full protection of the federal government. As a result, the

current owners of the newly discovered habitat would have to satisfy a
rigorous application process for permits if they wished to continue any
planned development.

At first glance such a situation seems incredible, yet discoveries of
endangered species and the resulting habitats can be a major headache for
developers in exurban communities. In areas outside of Sacramento,
California and Austin, Texas, development plans for hospitals and a WalMart were frustrated after similarly rare populations of species were found
on private land.' Currently, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) lists
one hundred eleven endangered species within Florida's borders, varying
in size from the tiny Okaloosa darter to the large Florida panther.'

Although some endangered species may exist solely within a single state's
borders, Congress used its interstate commerce authority to enact the 1973
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 5 creating a regulatory system to protect
the habitats of all endangered species. In Florida, the most famous
beneficiaries of the ESA have been the Florida panther and the manatee,
memorialized on license plates throughout the state; 6 yet it is the smaller,
less-publicized animals that have created the greatest controversy.

recovery_plans/1997/970930d.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
2. The annual per capita personal income for Levy County residents is roughly $10,000
lower than the per capita figures for Florida as a whole. See Levy County Profile,
http://www.eflorida.com/profiles/CountyReport.asp?CountyID=62&Display-all (last visited Mar.
21, 2005).
3. See NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624-26 (5th Cir. 2003).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Listings by State and Territory as of June 6,
2005, Florida, http://ecos.fws.gov/tesspublic/TESSWebpageUsaLists?state=all (last visited June
6, 2005). Currently, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS), under the Department of Interior,
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries, under the
Department of Commerce, share the regulatory duties under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Division of Endangered Species, Listing Program, http://endangered.fws.gov/ whatwedo.html (last
visited May 11, 2005). The FWS enacts regulations and promulgates permits for endangered
species-related developments occurring within the United States whereas the NOAA is responsible
for ocean-based endangered species. See id.; NOAA Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
5. 16 U.S.C. ch. 35 (2000).
6. In fact, the "Protect the Panther" and "Save the Manatee" specialty license plates were
first and second, respectively, in sales from 2000 to 2003 among Florida's eighty-four available
specialty plates. See Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 2004 Specialty Plate Sales
Rankings, http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/specialtytags/tagsales2004.pdf(last visited Aug. 30, 2005);
Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Panther, http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/
specialtytags/ProtectPanthers.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
7. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, A Fistful of Denial: The Supreme Court Takes a Pass on 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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Since the advent of the ESA, numerous authors have criticized the law
on policy grounds; ironically, it appears that the greatest threat to the ESA
is a constitutional challenge to its very existence. 8 When land developers'
projects are stymied because of the threat posed to unpopular or unknown
endangered species' habitats, nasty litigation seems certain.9 Further
inflaming ideological passions, oftentimes the ESA's "ugly stepchildren"
reside in only a few counties of a state, thereby uniting two groups in
opposition to the ESA-litigious developers and strict federalist
ideologues.' ° The nexus between these disparate interest groups has
culminated in recent years in increasing challenges to the constitutionality
of congressional environmental regulations." More specifically,
developers and their supporters have sought judicial determination that the
Commerce Clause Challengesto EnvironmentalLaws, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 469,490 (2004).
The author of this article, John C. Eastman, criticized protection efforts for the endangered silvery
minnow, as the FWS refused to release water to downstream states because of the effect it might
have on the minnow's habitat. Id. According to Eastman, the refusal to release water caused an
infestation of bark beetles that destroyed over 90% of Northern New Mexico's pinon trees. Id.
Conservative organizations, such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, offer self-described programs
that "put[] the Endangered Species Act on trial." See Pacific Legal Foundation, Endangered Species
Act Program, http://www.pacificlegal.org/ (follow "Special programs" hyperlink; then follow
"Endangered Species Act Reform Project" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
8. Commentators have frequently noted the "perverse" nature of the statute, as they argue
it encourages landowners to "get rid of [the species] before the government knows it's there." See,
e.g., J.B. Ruhl, EndangeredSpecies Act Innovations in the Post-BabbittonianEra-Are There Any?,
14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 419, 419 (2004). Other authors have noted the inherently reactive,
rather than proactive, nature of the statute, as species receive no federal protection until they are
on the brink of extinction. See, e.g., Craig Manson, The CollaborativeFutureof the Endangered
Species Act: An Address to the Duke UniversitySchool of Law, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 291,
295 (2004).
9. See John T. Winemiller, The EndangeredSpecies Act and the Imprecise Scope of the
SubstantialEffects Analysis, 18 TUL. ENVTL.L.J. 159, 198 (2004) (noting the creativity of the
ESA's opponents and their various litigation strategies that portray the statute as pitting hospitals
and schools against insignificant species).
10. For example, the Pacific Legal Foundation has written opinion articles challenging the
constitutional basis of the ESA generally (as well as other federal environmental regulations) and
the decision in GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton specifically. See M. Reed Hopper, "The
Endangered Species Act on Trial?", available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/ (follow "Op-Eds"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). One of the Foundation's litigation strategies, in fact, centers
on "challenging federal authority to regulate purely local species that have no connection to
'interstate commerce."' Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 7 (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
11. In a non-ESA context, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) was challenged as unconstitutional for exceeding Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162, 164 (2001) (challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' definition
of"navigable waters" on both a statutory and constitutional basis, as the Corps' definition permitted
federal environmental regulation of isolated wetlands); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506,
1510 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that CERCLA was a validly enacted statute regulating activities
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
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Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the power to regulate
the fate of intrastate species with little tangible commercial potential.12
These arguments, although purportedly limited to challenging the ESA's
applicability to intrastate endangered species, in actuality seek to challenge
the constitutionality of the ESA itself, as almost half of all listed species
reside in only a single state. 3 Further increasing the pressure on the FWS
and the ESA's defenders has been the political dynamic inherent in court

cases pitting environmental regulation against land development.' 4
The Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez'5 and Morrison16 provided
constitutional ammunition for these federalist-based challenges to
congressional Commerce Clause powers. Since Lopez and Morrison,
Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA have reached the Fourth, Fifth,
and D.C. Circuits. 7 Although all these circuits have upheld the ESA as a

12. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for Rehearing
En Banc at 2, GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (No.01-51099).
13. Jay Austin & Scott Schang, FundamentalistFederalism,21 THE ENVTL. F. 28, 32 (2004);
see also NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[a]pproximately 521
of the 1082 species in the United States currently designated as threatened or endangered are found
in only one state").
14. The re-election of George W. Bush could have a great impact on intrastate endangered
species. Given the recent spate of constitutional-based challenges, the fate of the ESA may rest in
the hands of the President's judicial nominees. However, if President Bush continues to appoint
(and Congress continues to confirm) judges with ideological underpinnings sympathetic to the
"Constitution in Exile" to the federal courts of appeal or the Supreme Court, the ESA is certain to
face further challenges to its existence. For example, Judge Edith Clement ofthe Fifth Circuit, who
dissented vociferously against ESA regulations in GDFRealty,was one ofPresident Bush'sjudicial
nominees from his first term. See Jeffrey Rosen, EvaluatingStrict Constructionists:How to Judge,
NEwREPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 2004, availableat http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i= 20041129&s=
rosen 112904 (last visited June 18, 2005). For a definition of "Constitution in Exile," see Jeffrey
Rosen, How the Election Affects the Court: Supreme Mistake, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20041108&s-rosen 110804 (last visited June
18, 2005). The term comes from a 1995 article written by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, in which Judge
Ginsburg argued that the true spirit of the constitution (as envisioned by the Founders) has been "in
exile" since the advent of judicial deference towards New Deal legislation. Id.; see also Jay E.
Austin et al., Judging NEPA:'A "HardLook" at JudicialDecision Making Under the National
Environmental Policy Act, ENVT'L. LAW INST.
8 (2004),
available at
http://www.endangeredlaws.org/downloads/JudgingNEPA.pdf (noting the disparity in decisions
in recent environmental cases by federal district courtjudges based on their nominating President).
The authors found that Republican-appointed judges tended to rule in favor of environmental
plaintiffs less than half as often as Democrat-appointed judges (roughly 28% versus 59%), and that
judges appointed by President George W. Bush tended to rule in favor of environmental plaintiffs
even less frequently (about 17% of cases). Austin, supra, at 8.
15. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Eastman, supra note 7, at 472
(arguing that after Lopez and Morrison, "the stage was set for new challenges to federal
environmental laws having no connection to interstate commerce").
17. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir 2000); GDF Realty v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (5th
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valid use of congressional Commerce Clause powers, there has been a
wide divergence in the underpinning logic, with glaring inconsistencies as
a result. 8 These divergences can be partially explained by the facts
particular to each case, including the type of species implicated or the
nature of the taking. However, while one court's argument seemingly runs
afoul of Morrison,19 another court seems to have so stretched the
definitional basis of interstate commerce that the publication of a few
scientific studies contributed to the finding of a link between the species
and interstate commerce. 20 Although the circuits have upheld the ESA
against the various Commerce Clause challenges, to inoculate the ESA
from future challenges there ought to be a rationale consistent with Lopez
and Morrison that protects all endangered species.
This Note will argue first and foremost for the continued need for
federal regulatory protections of endangered species, analyzing the various
constitutional arguments that courts have marshaled in support of the ESA.
Part II will consider the history and current mechanics of the ESA, from
prior congressional attempts at regulation to the modem statutory scheme.
Of particular importance is the anti-take provision, which prohibits
activities that may disturb endangered species through habitat alteration.
Part IR will analyze Morrison and Lopez, as these cases present the chief
constitutional argument against the ESA. Part IV will review the relevant
post-Lopez and post-Morrisoncircuit court decisions, exploring the logic
of the opinions as situated with the individual circumstances of each case.
Either through their natural range or due to recent environmental and
development-related pressures, almost half of the listed endangered
species now reside within the borders of a single state. 2' As such, Part V
of this Note will analyze the federal regulatory concerns from a Floridabased perspective. For a state, such as Florida, that has its own list of
protected species,22 a federal regulatory program for species protection

Cir. 2004); NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
18. See Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private
Commercial Development or the Taking ofProtected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 923,994 (2004)
(stating that the split in the circuits impacts "the scope of which types of projects the ESA may
regulate").
19. See id.at 924 (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit Court's consideration of the commercial
nature of the actor as the predicate for ESA regulation in Rancho Viejo, LLC, 323 F.3d 1062, was
inappropriate).
20. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 507 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 924-25.
22. Florida lists one hundred eighteen species that are either endangered, threatened, or of
special concern. See Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Florida's Imperiled
Species, available at http://wildflorida.org/imperiledspecies (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). Florida
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might seem redundant and unnecessary. However, environmental concepts
such as a "race to the bottom" affect all states." Furthermore, ecological
protection and ecological diversity are concepts ill-suited to the arbitrary
boundaries of our state system. Part VI will explore the latent, but real,
impact of healthy ecosystems upon interstate commerce. Accordingly, this
Note recommends the application of the Fifth Circuit's rationale,2" as it
seems best suited to provide protection to all endangered species from all
sources of potential "takes." Unfortunately, the constitutional-based
challenges to the ESA disguise and frustrate a meaningful debate about
potential ESA reforms that could lessen the impact of regulations on
landowners while simultaneously protecting some of our nation's scarce
natural resources.25 Therefore, this Note concludes with a recommendation
for a more holistic approach to questions of ESA constitutionality, for an
approach not limited to economic formulas but imbued with a greater
appreciation of the option values2 6 and biodiversity values endangered by
the loss of species nationwide.

currently has more species listed (and thus receiving state protection) than the number of
endangered and threatened species that the FWS has listed for Florida. Compareid., with supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
23. The phrase "race to the bottom" generally refers to, in the environmental context, a
phenomenon in which states "race" downward from the minimum optimal environmental standard
to lower environmental standards as a result of the competition for industry from fellow states. See
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and is it "To the
Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 (1997).
24. See infra Part IV.E.
25. Proponents and opponents of the ESA have argued for various reforms that could either
make the Act more fair to affected landowners or make the Act more effective with species'
rehabilitation, or both. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 430-34 (listing various reforms, enacted by the
Secretary of Interior during the Clinton administration, that sought to balance the goals of
conservation with the protection of private property rights). Craig Manson, the Assistant Secretary
for the FWS, has suggested the need for alternatives to critical habitat designation, as the
designation simply frustrates legitimate development and the anti-take provisions are sufficient for
species' protection. Manson, supra note 8, at 293-94. Manson also has touted landowner incentive
programs, which provide money to owners of land affected by the discovery of endangered species.
Id. at 296. The use of FWS funds to compensate landowners has not been without criticism,
however. See Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmersand CappuccinoCowboys: The Rhetoric of
the EndangeredSpeciesAct and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DuKE ENVTL. L. &POL'YF. 441,494-95
(2004) (questioning the payment of grant money by the FWS to private landowners when "the
Service is not requesting adequate funding to carry out its primary functions").
26. The option effect, option benefit, or option value is "the value of the possibility that a
future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless." See NAHB v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: ITS HISTORY AND
REGULATORY SCHEME

Historically, the federal government has acted to preserve individual
endangered species, and federal wildlife regulations of varying types have
been in force far longer than many other environmental regulations.27 The
Endangered Species Act should be viewed as the culmination of a series
of attempts by Congress to protect the nation's endangered species. 8 In the
Act's findings, Congress explicitly noted its concern about the "various
species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States [which] have been
rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and
development."29 Presumably, Congress derived its authority to implement
this simple, albeit extensive, regulatory statute from its Commerce Clause
powers.3"
The Endangered Species Act requires the Secretary of Interior, via the
Fish & Wildlife Services, first to determine whether an animal or plant
species is threatened with extinction; if so, the species is then listed in the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as either endangered or threatened.31
The Secretary must use the best scientific evidence and tools available for
classification.32 Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, the
27. See Mank, supra note 18, at 933 (noting the history of federal regulation of endangered
species, beginning with the 1900 Lacey Act, which made interstate trafficking of animals killed in
violation of state law a federal offense).
28. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 494 (4th Cir. 2000) (commenting on the history of
the 1973 Endangered Species Act in comparison to the prior Acts of 1966 and 1969, which had
enacted regulations protecting endangered species, but which applied only to species located on
federally owned land).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Although
Congress did not include ajurisdictional element clearly stating that the Commerce Clause was the
constitutional predicate for the ESA, the absence of such a statement is not fatal; to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, there need only be an independent judiciary review as to whether the
regulated activities substantially affect interstate commerce. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000). The factors permitting such a finding include the
destruction of the species' habitat, the overuse of the species for commercial or recreational
purposes (overfishing or overhunting), disease, or otherwise insufficient regulatory mechanisms
to protect the species or any other factors threatening the species' existence. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2000). This broad list of factors would permit the Secretary to classify
practically any species threatened with extinction regardless of the source of the threat. See id.
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000). Sometimes the FWS has struggled with classifying
endangered subspecies; and as technology has improved, the FWS has used DNA testing to insure
that listed species are distinct species rather than just a population pocket ofnonendangered species
physically separated from the rest of the species. John Heilprin, Mouse that Has Blocked Project
Loses Status, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2005, at A03. A recent example of the difficulty
de-listing
of the Preble's meadow jumping mouse. After
of this determination
the recent planned
Published
by UF LawisScholarship
Repository,
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FWS will promulgate a recovery plan for the species that provides a
description of the species and its habitat; the recovery plan also details the
necessary actions that could lead to the successful delisting of a species
(i.e., when the species achieves a more stable population size).33
Once a species is listed, it also receives regulatory protection against
unpermitted "takes" of any kind.3 4 To "take" is to "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct."3 5 The FWS-enacted regulations further clarify
"harm" to mean "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. 3 6 The
statute allows landowners with the proper permit to take an endangered
species, provided the take was "incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."37 Such permits must be
approved by the FWS, and they can require a great deal of negotiation and
flexibility on the part of the developer, who likely will not be able to fully
develop the project as planned.3 8 However, developments that threaten the
entire existence of a species have, in all likelihood, no chance of
approval.3 9

Il. CONGRESSIONAL COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS
Prior to the landmark decisions of Lopez and Morrison, congressional
authority, when vested under Commerce Clause powers, seemed nearly
absolute.4" Since the New Deal era of federal regulation and the landmark
a 1954 skeletal study, the species had been classified as a distinct subspecies; but following DNA
testing, the FWS concluded that the mouse was identical to the nonendangered Bear Lodge meadow
jumping mouse. Id.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2000).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000) ("[I]t isunlawful for any person... to... take any such species
within the United States.").

35. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
36. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004).
37. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
38. See Burke, supra note 25, at 452 (noting the high relative costs for small landownders
to obtain incidental take permits). A frequent compromise between landowners and the FWS
consists of a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), in which the landowner receives a permit allowing
incidental takes pursuant to certain FWS restrictions. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 431-32. Recently,
the FWS has also enacted a "banking" program similar to a banking program offered by the EPA
under the Clean Water Act, in which landowners may consolidate parcels of their land for habitat
preservation of listed species and may trade these accumulated parcels to other landowners who
need habitat parcels to qualify for an HCP permit. Id.at 435.
39. See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 625-26 (5th Cir. 2003).
40. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964) (holding
that Congress may regulate local activities that individually do not impact interstate commerce if, 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4

2005)

Shuler: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered in the Age of Strict Fed
ENDANGERED SPECIES

1143

Darby decision, 4' the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld all forms of
federal law enacted under the Commerce Clause.42 In its first twenty years,
the ESA appeared to be a legitimate exercise of congressional powers,
furthering important national interests; the Supreme Court itself utilized
the statute to enjoin the construction of a federally funded dam whose
completion threatened the existence of the endangered snail darter. 43 Like
many congressional regulations predicated on the Commerce Clause, the
ESA appeared to be sufficiently related to interstate commerce so as to
constitute a proper use of Article I powers."
Nearly sixty years of unchallenged regulatory power came to an end
with United States v. Lopez.45 The statute at issue, entitled the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, imposed federal criminal penalties for any individual
who knowingly possessed a firearm within a school zone. 46 The Court
overturned the Act for exceeding the Commerce Clause powers of Article
I, as the Act was a criminal statute having "nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise ... [it] is not an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity., 47 Furthermore, the Gun-Free
School Zones Act lacked a jurisdictional statement clarifying the
constitutional authority and underlying reasons for congressional

in the cumulative, these activities have a substantial and negative effect on commerce); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that conduct may be regulated even if such
conduct, when isolated, does not affect interstate commerce, provided that the aggregation of such
conduct nationwide does have a substantial affect on interstate commerce).
41. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Darby,the Court upheld the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, which had prohibited companies from shipping goods across states lines
if the companies' wages were below the required minimum wage. Id.at 109, 114. Commentators
cite Darbyfor its repudiation of earlier Commerce Clause decisions in which the Court consistently
rejected congressional attempts to regulate intrastate activity having an "indirect effect[]" on
interstate commerce. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 3.3, at 253-54 (2d ed. 2002). Post-Darby,the Court consistently held that so long as the activity
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress was within its powers to regulate that
activity. Id. § 3.3, at 254.
42. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, § 3.3, at 255 (noting that "[t]he law of the commerce
clause during this era could be simply stated: Congress could regulate any activity if there was a
substantial effect on interstate commerce," and that "in some cases, the Court even deleted the word
'substantial' and declared that Congress could regulate anything under the commerce clause so long
as there was a rational basis for believing that there was an effect on commerce").
43. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158, 189 (1978) (holding that the ESA
forbade completion of the dam, as it would cause the endangered snail darter's extinction, even
though Congress itself supplied federal funds for the completion of the dam).
44. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, § 3.3, at 255. From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme
Court refuted all challenges against Congressional regulations that were predicated on the basis of
its Commerce Clause powers. Id.
45. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
46. Id.at 551.
47. by
Id.UF
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regulation.4" Although in hindsight it appears clear that an individual
student's possession of a firearm in a school zone has almost zero effect
upon interstate commerce,49 the decision was revolutionary and seemingly
signaled a rollback of the regulatory powers of Congress.5" In Lopez, the
Court established a three-part test for planned interstate commerce
regulation: Congress may only regulate (1) the channels of interstate
commerce, (2) an instrumentality or thing in interstate commerce, or (3)
an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.51 The Court noted
that the regulated activity (here, guns in schools) did not fall under the
"channels" or "instrumentality" analysis.52 As the link between firearms
in schools and any effect on interstate commerce appeared tenuous,53 the
Court held that the Act exceeded congressional powers under Article V4
Lopez seemingly reversed almost sixty years of Commerce Clause
analysis overnight; the Court's decision in Morrison sent further
shockwaves, as the Court demonstrated that, first, its decision in Lopez
was not an aberration, and second, the Court would rigorously monitor
laws that sought to regulate intrastate activities.55 In Morrison, the issue
was whether the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and its civil
remedy provision were constitutionally appropriate uses of Commerce
Clause powers.56 The Act specifically stated that "[a]ll persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender."57 Per § 13981, a victim of such criminal violence
could sue the perpetrator in federal court.5 8 The Court reiterated that
48. Id.
49. Id. at 560 (noting that "[e]ven Wickard,which is perhaps the most far reaching example
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not").
50. See Eastman, supra note 7, at 471.
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 563, 567. The Government did not argue that this particular instance of gun
possession implicated interstate commerce but rather that gun possession in schools would result
in violent crime. See id. at 563. Violent crime, when aggregated, affects the national economy
through its inherent cost to victims (this cost is then passed onto the nation at large through
insurance) and through its negative effect on individuals' willingness to travel. Id. at 563-64.
54. Id. at 567-68. The Court noted the Government's arguments that the aggregated cost of
gun crime would cause substantial harm to the nation's economy and secondarily, that the cost of
gun crime would damage the educational process occurring in the schools, adversely affecting the
nation's economic potential. Id. at 563-64. The Court discounted the aggregation argument and
reasoned that the Government's rationale could lead to the regulation of almost any noneconomic
activity if it somehow impacted productivity of the citizenry and could infringe on state laws
dealing with crime or family matters. Id. at 564.
55. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 608 (2000).
56. Id. at 601-02, 605-06.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), invalidatedby Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
58. Id. § 13981(c).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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"[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its
powers enumerated in the Constitution. 5 9 Utilizing the Lopez test, the
Court found that Morrison fell into the third category of commerce
regulation (intrastate activities that purportedly had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce).6" The Court noted first that, unlike the statute in
Lopez, § 13981 provided congressional findings that clarified why
Congress felt it important to legislate in this sphere.61 However, the Court
was not persuaded by these findings, and it expressed concern about the
wide scope of potential regulations that could suddenly be deemed
acceptable due to a tangential link to interstate commerce.62 The Court was
especially concerned by the potentially limitless scope of such regulations
and the natural preemption of the states' traditional police powers.6 3
Had the Court considered the cost to society from the aggregation of
gender-motivated crimes to be an appropriate rationale for regulation,
Morrison probably would have had a different result. However, the Court
rejected aggregation, and while it did not express a categorical rule against
aggregation of noneconomic activity, it noted that "thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature."' The Court's
rejection of congressional attempts to regulate noneconomic activities,
which Congress had justified by aggregating the cost of all such activities
under the guise of Commerce Clause authority, clearly presented issues for
the Endangered Species Act.65

59. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
60. Id.at 609.
61. Id.at 614. Some of the findings, as noted by the Court, included the effect gender
violence has on the interstate economy by its effects on travel, employment opportunities, and
related medical costs. Id.at 615.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id.at 613.
65. In Morrison, the Court noted that the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence
Against Women Act both lacked a jurisdictional statement asserting that the legislation was
pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Id.Similarly, section 9 of the ESA has no
jurisdictional statement, yet the Commerce Clause is its predicate authority. Rancho Viejo, LLC
v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Following Lopez, commentators quickly grasped
the implications of the judicial narrowing of Commerce Clause authority. See, e.g., Anthony
Barone Kolenc, Casenote, Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L.
REv. 867,by909-11
(discussing
the tenuous
nature2005
of wildlife-protection statutes post-Lopez).
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IV. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IN THE 4TH, 5TH,
AND D.C. CIRCUITS
A. The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly
Following Lopez, the only challenge to the ESA to reach the circuit
courts of appeal was the 1997 case NationalAssociationofHome Builders
v. Babbitt.66 In 1993, after two years of study, the FWS officially listed the
Delhi Sands flower-loving fly as an endangered species.67 San Bernardino
County had investigated several sites for a planned "earthquake-proof'
hospital; and in 1992, before the fly was officially listed, the county
purchased a 76-acre site. 68 The FWS notified the county that the site also
served as habitat for the fly and that the planned construction would result
in a violation of the anti-take provisions of section 9 of the ESA. 69 The
parties modified the planned construction, and the hospital project moved
forward.70 In 1995, the county sought to redesign an intersection near the
hospital, which would reduce the corridor area set aside for the fly's
habitat. The FWS informed the county that the plan would result in an
impermissible taking.7 1 In 1995, the county, as well as the National
filed suit,
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the City of Colton,
72
claiming that section 9 of the ESA was unconstitutional.
The D.C. Circuit held that the prohibition on the taking of an
endangered intrastate species was a proper use of the federal government's
Commerce Clause authority. 73 Although the D.C. Circuit upheld the ESA,
the court split in concurring opinions as to why the regulations were
proper. 74 This first Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of

66. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Delhi Sands flower-loving fly is an orange-andbrown-colored fly species about one inch in length. See Shawnetta Grandberry & Chris Nagano,
Protectinga Flower-lovingFly, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 24, availableat
http://endangered.fws.gov/esb/98/09-10/24-25.pdf (last visited June 23, 2005). With flight skills
comparable to those of a hummingbird, the Delhi Sands fly feeds on the nectar of desert flowers.
Id. The fly's habitat is restricted to the dune areas of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. Id.
67. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1044.

68. Id.
69. Id.; see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
70. Id. The County and FWS worked to modify some of the plans to eliminate the effect of
construction on the fly. Id. This included moving the hospital 250 feet north of its original planned
site and creating an 8.35 acre habitat preserve for the fly. Id. Of further importance, the parties
agreed to create a one hundred-foot corridor to link two fly habitats, permitting fly breeding
between the two different colonies. Id.
71. Id. at 1045.
72. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the application of section 9 to
takes of the fly, an intrastate species, was unconstitutional in light ofLopez. Id
73. Id. at 1057.

74. See id. at 1046 n.3. The judges split on whether the first aspect of regulation was12
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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the ESA was just a precursor to the flood of litigation following United
States v. Morrison,75 and the D.C. Circuit would later revisit its NAHB
decision
and reconsider its constitutional analysis of the ESA in Rancho
76
Viejo.

B. The Red Wolf
The red wolf s habitat once spread across the southeastern United
States, but by 1976 its existence was threatened by both habitat destruction
and hunting.77 As a result, the species was listed as endangered and the
remaining animals were captured and placed into a captive breeding
program. 78 Between 1987 and 1992, forty-two red wolves were released
back into the wild in the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in
eastern North Carolina. 79 By 1998, however, more than half of the roughly
seventy-five red wolves in the wild lived on private lands, potentially
proper-that is, whether endangered species qualified as channels of interstate commerce (both
judges agreed that biological diversity contributes to a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
See id. Judge Wald found section 9 to be constitutional on several bases. Id. at 1046, 1049. First,
Judge Wald stated that the anti-take provision fell under the congressional authority to regulate the
channels of interstate commerce. Id. Judge Wald provided two reasons. First, the anti-take
provision of the ESA is necessary to "control the transport of the endangered species in interstate
commerce"; second, the anti-take provisions were an appropriate use of congressional authority "'to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses."' Id. (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). Judge Wald also found regulation to be
appropriate as the ESA substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1049. Judge Wald cited
the ESA's Congressional findings and an amicus brief, which expressed concern that extinction
could foreclose the discovery of presently unknown cures. Id.at 1051, 1052-53. Although Judge
Wald stated that the impact of extinctions on biodiversity substantially affected interstate
commerce, she primarily focused on the immediate, albeit hypothetical, effects of extinction. Id.
at 1053-54. While disagreeing with Judge Wald about the appropriateness of regulations based on
"an uncertain potential medical or economic value," Judge Henderson concurred overall in the
decision. Judge Henderson agreed specifically that biodiversity and its effect on the ecosystem
substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring). Judge
Henderson further reasoned that the ESA sought to regulate notjust listed species, but their habitats
as well. Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring). Because the construction of the hospital and the
redesigned traffic intersection had a clear connection to interstate commerce, Judge Henderson
found regulation to be appropriate. Id.(Henderson, J., concurring).
75. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see infra Parts IV.B-D.
76. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
77. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,488 (4th Cir. 2000). Red wolves generally have a mixedcolor coat of black, brown, gray, and yellow fur (the red wolf moniker presumably comes from the
reddish coats of Texan wolf populations). See Red Wolf,National Parks Conservation Association,
http://www.npca.org/wildlife-protection/wildlife-facts/redwolf.asp (last visited June 26,2005). The
adult male red wolf weighs between sixty and eighty pounds while the adult female weighs between
forty and sixty pounds. Id. Red wolves tend to hunt either alone or in small groups, preferring small
mammals and occasionally deer. Id.
78. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488.
79. by
Id.UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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threatening landowners or their livestock.8 0 These wolves were the center
of controversy in Gibbs v. Babbitt.8 1 Per section 9 of the ESA, the
landowners were precluded from intentional takings, including harassing,
harming, injuring or killing the animals. 82 In response to landowner
concerns, the FWS permitted a taking if it was in defense of a person's life
or if the wolves were in the act of killing the landowners' livestock. 3
Public pressure mounted, however, and several landowners filed a suit
challenging the federal government's authority to regulate the red wolf on
private land. 4
What makes Gibbs unique among the ESA challenges is the nature of
the endangered species at issue. Unlike the habitats of the species at issue
in Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, discussed infra,5 the red wolf s habitat
has not always been restricted to one state.86 Using the analytical
framework set out by the Lopez and Morrison decisions, the Fourth Circuit
first emphasized that the taking of red wolves involved a number of
commercial activities.8 7 Although the red wolf s commercial impact at that
time was miniscule, its potential future commercial impact merited
significant consideration. 8 The court explicitly considered four areas in
which the regulations protecting the red wolf implicated commercial
concerns. 89 First, the court included the red wolf as part of the wildliferelated tourism industry, and noted the popularity of so-called "howling
events" in which tourists traveled to North Carolina's Smoky Mountains
National Park to listen to wolf howls.9 ° The court also reasoned that
80. See id at 488-89.
81. Id. at 489.
82. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
83. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488.
84. See id. at 489. In addition to the lawsuit, the North Carolina General Assembly passed
a bill allowing landowners to kill red wolves if the landowner had already requested the FWS to
remove the animals from the property. There was no actual conflict between the federal and state
statutes as the North Carolina statute was never applied. Id.
85. See infra Parts IV.C-D.
86. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488. The Court noted the "pervers[ity] indeed if a species nearing
extinction were found to be beyond Congress's power to protect while abundant species were
subject to fill federal regulatory power." Id. at 498. Even commentators critical of the ESA's
applicability to solely intrastate species have also stressed the absurdity of a regulatory program
that loses the power of regulation just as the recipient of such regulation requires more federal
protection. See Jeffirey H. Wood, Recalibratingthe FederalGovernment's Authority to Regulate
IntrastateEndangeredSpecies After SWANCC, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 117 (2003).
87. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
88. Id. at 495 (noting that "the relative scientific value and commercial impact of... red
wolves is for Congress and the FWS, informed as they are by biologists, economists, and others
whose expertise is best delivered to the political branches, not the courts").
89. Id. at 493-95.
90. Id. at 493. The dissent criticized this commercial impact, noting that it was based solely
upon an unpublished study. See id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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scientific study of the red wolf impacted interstate commerce,9" as did the
potential revival of the pelt trade, even though red wolf pelts were last
routinely sold in the nineteenth century.92 Finally, the court noted that the
taking of red wolves by landowners was inherently related to the
landowners' activity, i.e., agriculture.93 Aside from any particular effect
the red wolf had on interstate commerce, the court also stressed that the
regulations were part of an overall federal system designed to protect
endangered species in their role as scarce natural resources. To have ruled
otherwise, the court noted, would negatively implicate the power of the
federal government to protect rare resources for the betterment of
citizens.94
C. The Arroyo Toad
The Arroyo toad, native to southern California and Mexico's Baja
California region, was listed as an endangered species by the Secretary of
Interior in December 1994. 9' Rancho Viejo, LLC planned a home
development on a 202-acre site in San Diego County, but the discovery of
Arroyo toads near an abutting creek drew the attention of the FWS. 96
Because Arroyo toads' habitats range about only one mile from the
streams where they breed, the toads' existence was threatened by the large
scale development.97
The FWS refused to permit Rancho Viejo's planned development due
to the threat to the toads. 98 Despite a FWS proposal that would have
allowed development under different circumstances, 99 Rancho Viejo
91. Id. at 494.
92. Id. at 495.
93. Id. This final link between the take and the commercial nature of the actor has been cited
in later cases (primarily in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2003)); but the link itself has been challenged by other courts in ESA cases as the argument "would
allow application of otherwise unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors ... [and] would
'effectually obliterate' the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause." GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th Cir. 2003).
94. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495-96.
95. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065. The Arroyo toad is lightly colored, often grayish-green
or tan, and only measures about two-to-three inches in length, with "warty skin." Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants, http://endangered.fws.gov/r/fr94568.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2005). Development and dam construction in southern California destroyed much of the toad's
natural habitat, and most of the remaining populations of toads are found near the Cleveland

National Forest in San Diego County. id.
96. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
97. See id.

98. See id.
99. Rancho Viejo planned to use roughly 750,000 cubic yards of fill dirt from seventy-seven
acres of its land, including portions of the Keys Creek stream bed that served as the Arroyo toads'
which Rancho Viejo could continue the housing
proposed an arrangement
habitat. Id.
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instead brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior, claiming that the
ESA, and specifically the ESA's protection of an intrastate toad species,
exceeded congressional powers under the Commerce Clause.'00 The D.C.
Circuit Court treated the toads as an isolated, solely intrastate species l l
(conveniently ignoring that the Arroyo toad also lives in Baja California
across the Mexican border).0 2
The D.C. Circuit Court also applied the necessary Morrisonand Lopez
logic, albeit in a different fashion than the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs.'°3
Rather than focus on the commercial impact of the species itself, the court
instead focused on the activity that was to be regulated, defining the
regulated activity as "the construction of Rancho Viejo's housing
development."'0 4 Furthermore, unlike the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs, the court
held that the take itself was the object of regulation, not the toad.0 5 Since
the ESA sought "to regulate 'economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation,"" 0' 6 the court
interpreted Morrison and Lopez to allow the developer's actions, which
were clearly commercial in nature, to be the focus, rather than the
endangered species." 7 Because the housing development implicated
interstate commerce, the court noted, Congress had every right to impose
regulations upon the development via the ESA." 8 However, by the court's
own admission, its focus on the nature of the taking entity would exclude
the lone hiker or landowner whose takes are not part of a large commercial
activity.109

development provided that Rancho Viejo obtained fill dirt from an off-site source rather than from
the Keys Creek stream bed. Id.
100. Id. at 1066.
101. See id. at 1069.
102. See Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arroyo Toad (Bufo califomicus),
70 Fed. Reg. 7459, 7460 (Feb. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
103. CompareRancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1067 (referencing NAHB v. Babbitt, the court briefly
noted the first rationale that the NAHB court had relied upon: the loss of biodiversity itself and its
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. The Rancho Viejo court explicitly stated that even
though it relied upon NAHB's second rationale, it did "not mean to discredit the first." Id. n.2), with
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,492 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding a nexus between the red wolf itself and
interstate commerce).
104. Id. at 1069.
105. See id. at 1072 (noting that the "regulated activity is Rancho Viejo's planned commercial
development, not the arroyo toad that it threatens. The ESA does not purport to tell toads what they
may or may not do."). Contra Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492 (stating that the taking of a red wolf impacts
interstate commerce because of the potential commercial nature of the species involved).
106. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072-73 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000)).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1073.
109. Id. at 1077.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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D. The Texas Cave Invertebrates

Following Morrison, the Fifth Circuit also heard a Commerce Clause
challenge to the ESA, this time involving a planned development that
threatened an assortment of six endangered invertebrate cave-dwellers near
Austin, Texas. 110 In GDF Realty, the landowners bought the subject
property in 1983 for investment purposes, but in 1989 the FWS notified
the landowners that the planned development might amount to an
impermissible take of an endangered species. 11 For the next nine years,
the landowners and the FWS sparred over potential development,
culminating in a FWS letter notifying the landowner that any permit for an
incidental take would be denied, effectively blocking any development
plan for the property. 2
The landowners brought suit against the FWS, claiming that the ESA's

take provisions exceeded the Commerce Clause powers granted under

Article I, and as a result, were unconstitutional.11 3 The district court, noting
that the planned development included a Wal-Mart and an apartment
complex, held that there was a sufficient link to interstate commerce and
granted summary judgment for the FWS. 14 The district court found the
commercial impact of the Cave Species to be fairly irrelevant, and focused
instead on the development as the regulated activity." 5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit expressed concern that the expansive logic
of the district court would uphold otherwise unconstitutional statutes
solely because of their application to commercial actors. 16 The court
rejected the district court's analytical underpinnings, which, like the
Rancho Viejo court, upheld the ESA on the basis of the regulated actor's
commercial intentions with the property. 17 Instead, the court narrowed its

110. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2003). The Cave
Species, as they are called, vary in size from 1.4 millimeters to 8 millimeters in length. Id. at 625.
Four of the Cave Species are subterranean arachnids (a class of species including spiders and
scorpions); the other two Cave Species are subterranean beetles. Id. Four of the six species are
eyeless. Id. The Cave Species have been found only in two counties in Texas. Id. Because of the
threat to their habitat, the lack of state or federal laws protecting them, and their inherently
precarious existence, all of the Cave Species were placed on the endangered list by 1993. Id.
111. Id. at 624-25.
112. Id. at 626. The district court chastised the FWS for not actually denying the permits.
Although the notification of future permit denial had the same effect, as issued it would seemingly
prevent the landowners from challenging the denial in court. Id.
113. Id.
114. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658, 664 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
115. Id.
116. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634.
117. Id. The court stated:
of the Commerce
the Scholarship
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analysis to the "expressly regulated activity," i.e., the takes of the Cave
Species and whether the takes had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." 8 Unlike the red wolves at issue in Gibbs, the Cave Species
could not be said to impact interstate commerce via tourism or scientific
study." 9 If the ESA's regulations were based solely on the takings of
individual species, then the Cave Species clearly failed to implicate
interstate commerce in any way.'20 The Cave Species' fate was preserved,
however, as the court agreed with the FWS's alternative argument: The
takes of all endangered species, including the Cave Species, should be
aggregated, and as such, the aggregation of takes clearly has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.' 2 ' The court found aggregation to be
appropriate because the regulation of Cave Species was part of a
comprehensive regulatory system, the ESA, which itself was in great part
economic in nature.'22 Furthermore, each individual instance of the
regulated activity (the taking) is essential to the ESA, as endangered
species, by their very nature, exist in small groups; each allowed taking
would strip the ESA of its very purpose.123
GDF petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, but per
curiam, the court denied a rehearing.' 24 The dissent argued for a speciesby-species review rather than an aggregation approach, as it could not
"fathom" how certain species, such as the Cave Species, were part of an
economic regulatory system or how a taking of such species was a
commercial activity.' 25 Such an approach might permit the regulations, as
they pertain to more overtly commercial species, such as the red wolf in

construing it, suggest that, concerning substantial effect vel non, Congress may
regulate activity (here, Cave Species takes) solely because non-regulated conduct
(here, commercial development) by the actor engaged in the regulated activity will
have some connection to interstate commerce.
Id.
118. Id. at633.
119. Seeid. at 637.
120. See id. at 637-38. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the regulation of the
Cave Species or their habitat could result in unknown future benefits implicating interstate
commerce, as this was "simply too hypothetical and attenuated.., to pass constitutional muster."
Id. at 638.
121. See id. at 638-40.
122. Id. at 639-40. The court referred to the ESA's legislative history and referenced the
cumulative impact of mass extinction on the ecological gene pool, which clearly would have a huge
(albeit unknowable) effect on interstate commerce. Id.
123. See id. at 640.
124. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (denying
petition for rehearing en banc).
125. Id. at 290-91 (Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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Gibbs.12 6 For the Cave Species, however, it would be the state's
prerogative, not the federal government's, whether to permit the take.'27
E. Analysis of the Circuit CourtDecisions
Florida's judicial circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, has not
yet heard a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA, and the wide variance
in logic from circuit to circuit presents a challenge for those who would
defend the Act in the Eleventh Circuit. Ultimately, all three federal
circuits, when confronted with challenges to the ESA, upheld the statute;
however, the split in the circuits regarding the appropriate basis for the
ESA's constitutionality presents challenges for defenders of the Act. 128 The
Gibbs court's willingness to consider the unknown or future economic
value of an endangered species (in that case, the red wolf) would
seemingly permit judicial tolerance of federal regulation of our nation's
larger animals, especially mammals and birds.'29 The regulations
prohibiting takes of such species could also form a nexus with the wildliferelated tourism industry.130 Furthermore, an analysis dedicated to future
economic impact, or the species' option effect, could potentially include
endangered plant species, as extinction could foreclose medicinal
advances. 3 ' However, such analysis does little for our nation's smaller
animal species that cannot credibly be claimed to be a source for future
tourism, trade, or scientific inquiry.
The Rancho Viejo court's analysis, with its focus on the commercial
nature of the actor, leads to two problems.' First, a general suggestion
that any congressional regulation may be proper if predicated on the
regulated actor's commercial ties would seemingly contradict the logic of

126. Id. at 291 (Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
127. Incidentally, the regulations protecting the Cave Species prohibited not only private
development, but also a planned state highway. Id. at 292 (Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). Had the court ruled differently, presumably both the private developer and the
state would have begun construction, resulting in a taking of the species.
128. See Sara D. Van Loh, Note, The Latest andGreatest Commerce Clause Challengesto the
EndangeredSpecies Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 482 (2004)
(questioning the likely vitality of regulations for intrastate endangered species under either the GDF
Realty or the Rancho Viejo opinions). The author instead suggests the ESA could be upheld on the
basis of(1) avoiding a race to the bottom and (2) respecting congressional concerns about the loss
ofbiodiversity. Id. at 483-84. Other authors have noted the discrepancy in the circuit court opinions
regarding the actual object of regulation: The taking of an endangered species (per GDFRealty),
or the commercial development that causes a taking (per Rancho Viejo). See, e.g., Winemiller,
supra note 9, at 160-61.
129. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (2000).
130. See id. at 493.
131. See id. at 494.
F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Norton, 3232005
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Lopez and Morrison that the Commerce Clause power does not grant
infinite powers to Congress.133 Second, by the court's own admission,
hikers or landowners would be exempt from federal environmental
regulations prohibiting takes solely due to their status as noncommercial
actors, despite the obvious threat unrelated takings might inflict upon
endangered species regardless of the actor.134
The Fifth Circuit's rationale in GDF Realty appears best suited to
respond to any future challenges to the ESA.135 The Fifth Circuit's analysis
would protect an endangered species, not just for its potential commercial
value (as implicated in Gibbs), nor for the commercial nature of the threat
to the species (for example, by commercial actors as in Rancho Viejo), but
instead because of its status as an endangered species.'36 Realistically, the
option value of the subterranean eyeless arachnid is low; yet if aggregated
with all endangered species, the taking of it clearly implicates interstate
commerce.
V. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FLORIDA'S WILDLIFE

Florida is home to one hundred eleven threatened and endangered
species, the fourth highest number of listed species of any state in the

133. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 18, at 994. Mank notes that the
Viejo court's focus on economic activity could allow Congress to regulate
wedding ceremonies, which are not economic activities in themselves, if they
result in the renting of a large hotel or reception hall that has significant impacts
on interstate commerce. This is so even though Lopez and Morrisonemphasized
that family law and marriage are traditional areas of state regulation.
134. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1077. Chief Judge Ginsburg, in his concurring opinion, further
sought restriction of the holding to commercial actors only. See id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J.,
concurring). Chief Judge Ginsburg stated:
[A] take can be regulated if-but only if-the take itself substantially affects
interstate commerce. The large-scale residential development that is the take in
this case clearly does affect interstate commerce. Just as important, however, the
lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape
his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce [and
therefore this take may not be regulated].
Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
135. Several commentators have similarly argued that the
upholding the ESA best addresses the constitutional challenge
comprehensive nature of the regulations. See Mank, supra note 18,
note 9, at 199-200.
136. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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nation." 7 Any policy reconsideration of endangered species regulations
should consider how Florida's distinctive and varied wildlife, whose
habitat stretches from the Panhandle to the Florida Keys, is an economic
boon in and of itself. 38 In fact, the estimated annual commercial impact 139
of
wildlife-related tourism on Florida's economy exceeds $1.3 billion.
Theme parks, aquariums, and zoos, featuring all types of Florida wildlife
and fauna, are scattered throughout the state and are a tribute to the
economic potential inherent in preserving our state's unique wildlife.
However, the ESA and Florida's regulatory regime protect all endangered
species, not just those that attract tourist dollars. Without the federal
regulatory system under the ESA, the economic potential of conservation
exhibits might be the last level ofprotection for our state's endangered and
threatened species. A justification of regulation based on tourism dollars
would likely make the continued fate for those species, such as the salt
marsh vole, which presumably does not attract a zoological following,
even more precarious.
Four years after the passage of the ESA, Florida enacted its own
species-protection act, which provided for the listing and regulatory
protection of endangered species. 40 This act, entitled "Florida Endangered
and Threatened Species Act"'' and corresponding to the federal
Endangered Species Act,142 created a listing of protected species separate
from the listing in the Endangered Species Act. 143 Under the Declaration
of Policy within the Endangered and Threatened Species Act, the Florida
Legislature stated that, because "Florida has more endangered and
threatened species than any other continental state, it is the intent

. . .

to

conserve and protect these species as a natural resource."'" Currently, the
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) lists one
hundred eighteen species that receive some form of regulatory

137. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System Listings
by State and Territory as of September 22, 2005, Table of Contents, http://ecos.fws.gov/
tesspublic/TESSWebpageUsaLists?state=ali (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
138. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 372.072(2) (2005) (declaring that the "[l]egislature recognizes that
the State of Florida harbors a wide diversity of fish and wildlife and that it is the policy of this state
to conserve and wisely manage these resources").
139. William J. Snape II & Robert M. Ferris, Saving America's Wildlife: Renewing the
EndangeredSpecies Act, http://www.defenders.org/pubs/save04.html (last visited Aug. 30,2005).
140. FLA. STAT. § 372.072 (2005).
141. Id.
142. FLA. STAT. § 372.0725 (2005).
143. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.003 to 68A-27.005 (2005), Per FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 68A-27.0012 (2005), The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission makes
listing decisions based on its findings without reference to the FWS listings.
144. FLA. STAT. § 372.072 (2005).
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protection.' 45 In many ways, the Florida Endangered and Threatened
Species Act mirrors the ESA; similar to the anti-take provisions of the
ESA, the FWC's regulations prohibit takings or other harassment of
endangered species, threatened species, or species of special concern.' 46
As a result of Florida's laws and regulations, the federal court
challenges to the ESA might seem remote or unconnected to Florida's
wildlife concerns. After all, since Florida has its own regulatory system for
its species, the trials and travails of Texan cave invertebrates or
Californian toads might seem rather unimportant. However, Florida's
regulatory system for endangered species does not exist in a vacuum; our
state laws and regulations are backed by a federal regulatory program.
These two systems tend toward mutual reinforcement.'47 If the federal
regulatory system were held to be an unconstitutional regulation of state
activities, this reinforcement mechanism would cease to exist.
Furthermore, the sudden abrogation of a thirty-year nationwide
preservation effort (with its inherent minimum standards for species
protection) would be replaced instead with fifty competing standards.'48
Under such a scenario, it is unclear whether the fate of all federally listed
species would be left to the individual states, or whether the ESA would
remain viable only for certain interstate species or species with some

145. Since its creation, Florida's Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission has been
charged with the responsibilities of species regulation. See Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission, Florida's Imperiled Species, http://wildflorida.org/imperiledspecies/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2005).
146. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 68A-27 (2005). Under FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A27.0011 (2005), it is illegal to kill, wound, or attempt to kill or wound any designated endangered
species. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.003 (2005) and FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.004
(2005) list the state's endangered and threatened species; these regulations also prohibit takes of
an endangered or threatened species. Per Regulation 68A-27.005, Florida has an additional category
named Species of Special Concern, which includes species that may already be threatened (but
there is a lack of conclusive data on the species' numbers) or may become threatened due to habitat
modifications. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.005 (2005). Like the endangered and threatened
species, species of special concern may not be possessed, transported, sold, or "take[n]." FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.005(l)(a) (2005).
147. An individual species may be protected under both federal and state regulations, and an
individual who takes a dually listed species may be criminally prosecuted under either the ESA or
its Florida Statutory counterpart, or both. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) and FLA. STAT.§ 372.072 (2005).
148. In GDFRealty, several states (including Texas, the site of the controversy) submitted an
amici curiae brief in support of the developers' petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. These
states argued that the "[s]tates have demonstrated that they are able and willing to protect
endangered species within their borders, and the vast majority of States have enacted regulatory
schemes for ensuring that protection." Brief of the States of Texas, Alaska, Delaware, and North
Dakota as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 125 S. Ct. 2898
(2004) (No. 03-1619). The willingness of the states to remove federal regulatory standards
highlights this concern; clearly some states would permit development to the detriment of species'
preservation.
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commercial effect.' 49 Were this to occur, the protection of individual
endangered species might not rest on the scientific or ecological facts, but
rather on the litigation skills of a particular species' proponent.
A final issue potentially confronting Florida (or any other state that
maintains environmental protection laws for its endangered species) is the
race to the bottom problem that plagues environmental regulations that
differ from state to state. 150 To state it simply, imagine that Georgia or
Alabama consistently allowed development resulting in the takings of
endangered species while other states (such as Florida) denied such
development projects. The "business-friendly" states would attract more
investment and development while states retaining their environmental
regulatory regimes would suffer a requisite loss in investment and
economic growth. The market forces that initially benefit certain states
would encourage (and pro-business citizens would demand) other states
to follow suit. 5 ' This chain of events, resulting from the judicial
dismantling of a minimum federal regulatory protection system, would
threaten the almost half of all listed endangered species that reside in only

149. This uncertainty and the requirement of a case-by-case analysis for each species are an
unmentioned drawback to the argument for continued federal regulation of certain species while
leaving solely (and historically) intrastate species to the mercy of states. See Wood, supra note 86,
at 118-21 (arguing for federal regulation only for those species whose historic range was not limited
to a single state or those species that somehow have an effect on interstate commerce).
150. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[s]tates may decide
to forego or limit conservation efforts in order to lower these costs, and other states may be forced
to follow suit in order to compete"). The Fourth Circuit also stated that "[tihe Supreme Court has
held that Congress may... arrest the 'race to the bottom' in order to prevent interstate competition
whose overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment." Id.
151. Some authors have criticized the race to the bottom theory as an insufficient predicate
for federal regulation and have argued that the so-called race does not even exist. See, e.g., Wood,
supra note 86, at 115. Wood notes that following the SWANCC decision, in which the Supreme
Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers had no jurisdiction over isolated, nonnavigable bodies
of water, states actually increased their regulatory programs to encompass these bodies of water.
Id.This argument ignores the relatively short history following the SWANCC decision and the
temptations that might arise to lower regulatory burdens over the next few years. Furthermore,
several of the ESA cases have involved state and local government actors, whose planned
developments or improvements were precluded as a result of the discovery of endangered species'
habitats. See, e.g., NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In Gibbs, the North
Carolina General Assembly intervened in the red wolf controversy, as the state enacted laws
directly contradicting federal regulations that pertained to the takings of the reintroduced species.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489. Had the North Carolina law been the sole regulation pertaining to red
wolves, farmers could kill any red wolf on their land provided they had previously requested the
FWS to remove the animal. See id. Wood's hopeful argument that his new approach to species
protection will not result in a race to the bottom issue is questionable in light of actual state
behavior, as in Gibbs and GDF Realty. Unlike the increased state role in wetlands protection
programs, state action in these recent ESA court challenges suggest that intrastate endangered
species will receive less protection without the federal role.
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one state.'5 2 As a result of the ensuing market forces, Florida might have
to succumb to this pressure and reconsider its regulatory protections for
native species.
VI. BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEMS, AND THE IMPRECISE
MEASUREMENT OF COMMERCE

Although certain species may be limited territorially to a small region
within one state, the effects of their very existence may be extremely
difficult to measure. 153 In this age of sprawling suburban developments, an
argument requiring that the economic value of a single species determine
its ultimate viability undercuts a basic ecosystemic approach. Congress
justified much of the ESA on the loss of species and its requisite effect, not
only on genetic variety, but also on the potential loss of future benefits
accruing from further study of the species.' 54
As scientific evidence accumulates, it appears incontrovertible that
there is an ongoing interdependence among various species within
ecosystems; 155 furthermore, it appears that ecosystems likewise are
interdependent. 5 6 A narrow, commerce-oriented approach that views only
those events resulting immediately in an exchange of monetary benefits
152. See Austin & Schang, supra note 13, at 32.
153. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 644 (5th Cir. 2003) (Dennis, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[t]he interrelationship of commercial and non-commercial species is...
complicated, intertwined, and not yet fully understood").
154. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) ("Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for
cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may
yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed?").
155. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the
EndangeredSpecies Act Encroachon TraditionalState Authority and Exceed the OuterLimits of
the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 786 (2002) (arguing that many species that lack any
particular "commercial value perform important 'ecosystem services' such as the decomposition
of organic matter, renewal of soil, mitigation of floods, purification of air and water, or partial
stabilization of climatic variation"); see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 36 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that scientists seek to

understand all facets of the ecosystem and that a typical ecological slogan, "[E]verything is
connected to everything else" furthers this concept of interdependence).
156. See Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation,Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A
Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1129 (1996)
(criticizing the ESA for its "species-by-species, reaction-to-crisis approach" that ignores the need
for a more holistic approach). The author argues forcefullythat as "scientists have rediscovered that
the world cannot meaningfully be broken down into isolated parts, that every part is connected to
every other part." Id. A real world example of ecosystem interaction occurs each year as the snow
from the Rocky Mountain region melts, forming the Colorado River, which provides the water
supply for the southwestern region of the United States. See The Colorado River: Water and the
Desert, http://www.desertusa.com/colorado/intro/duintrocr.html (last visited May 11, 2005).
Degradation in the ecosystem of the River's origination point clearly would impact downstream
states and their varied ecosystems. See id.
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would ignore the interdependence of our regions and the "option value"' 57
of our endangered species. 5 ' Furthermore, if such an approach coincided
with a strict belief in the sacredness of state boundaries, it would dismantle
much of the federal environmental regulatory system, such as the Clean
Water Act or the Clean Air Act. 159
Unfortunately, the ecosystems we inhabit and the species we protect
are not neatly divided along the arbitrary boundaries of our states. The
Arroyo toad, Delhi Sands fly, and red wolf do not exist in an ecological
vacuum, but rather are part of a greater food chain implicating regions
larger than their natural habitat. 160 Migrating animals from other states
potentially interact with endangered species, either as predators or prey.
For example, one reason the red wolf was the bane of North Carolina
farmers and ranchers was its propensity for attacking livestock. 16' Left
unmentioned in the debate is the predatory effect of the wolves on the
region's deer population. 162 Without natural predators, deer will
a region, negatively affecting both the environment and local
overpopulate
63
industries. 1
The effects of subtle changes in one ecosystem flow to, and affect,
ecosystems across state lines regardless of federalist arguments to the

157. The option value of species is similar to the option value of any commodity; it refers to
a future value that we do not currently possess, but might in the future. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. In the case of endangered species, this is reflected in the findings of the House
Report, which noted concern about the potential for medicines or genetic variation that are lost with
each extinction. See supranote 154.
158. See NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing
congressional rationale regarding the ESA with rationale behind the Gun-Free School Zones Act
in Lopez, as the House Report specifically mentions the possibility of future medical advances from
endangered species' research). The court noted that it was restrained in its valuation ofbiodiversity;
but it quoted favorably from biologist Edward 0. Wilson, who stated that traditional economic
approaches will undervalue the worth of species as there is still a fundamental connectedness
among species within the food web. Id. at 1052 n. 11 (quoting EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIvERsITY
OF LIFE 308 (1992)). According to Wilson, a loss of a few endangered species could threaten far
more than is first appreciably realized. Id.
159. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000).
160. See Mank, supra note 18, at 998 (arguing that "[blecause commercially insignificant
species often exist interdependently with more valuable species, taking of any species will probably
have important effects on commercially valuable species and ecosystems").
161. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
162. See supra note 77; see also Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495 (noting that red wolves "may in fact
help [the landowners], and in so doing confer additional benefits on commerce... by killing the
animals that destroy their crops").
163. If the population of deer exceeds the local region's carrying capacity, the population will
consume all of the available vegetation, resulting in damage to timber reproduction and the local
timber industry. For more information, see North Carolina State University's North Carolina
Cooperative Extension Service, Deer Management (1995), http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/nreos/forest/
woodland/won-12.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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contrary.'64 Despite the rationale utilized, be it the option value of species'
gene pools, the actual commercial effect from their rehabilitation, or the
aggregated effect of the mass extinction of all endangered species, it seems
imperative that there remain a role for the federal government in
endangered species regulation. While Florida may protect its threatened
species independent of the federal government, it is likely that Florida

cannot escape the ecological effect if, in the absence of a federal role,
other states act differently.
VII. CONCLUSION

For ESA analysis, there are two questions: first, whether there needs to
be a federal regulatory system in addition to any state provision for the
protection of endangered species, and second, determining the appropriate
rationale for such a system within current Commerce Clause analysis.
Some authors have argued that a one-size fits all policy for endangered
species is inappropriate for a nation as large and biologically diverse as the
United States.'65 However, through congressional findings and
accumulated scientific evidence, it appears that a federal regulatory
scheme, especially with complementary state regulations, is an important
and vital component of species protection. At the very least, a federal
regulatory program provides minimum standards for species' protection,
which states may then strengthen to reflect local priorities.
It is unpopular species, the favorite species for cases challenging the
constitutionality of the ESA, that most need the protection of the federal
government. The Florida panther, the manatee, and the American crocodile
are identifiable species that certainly grab the public's attention more than
an underground eyeless arachnid. Yet if it is true that all species remain
interconnected within their ecosystem, their public appeal should not be
the determining criterion for their continued survival. The ESA provides
the necessary federal framework to ensure this.

164. See Snape & Ferris, supra note 139 ("A fundamental tenet of the science of ecology is
that all elements in an ecosystem are interconnected and interdependent."). The exact effect on an
ecosystem of the loss of a single species is unknowable, but "the effect of losing even seemingly
inconsequential species adds up over time... [and] may play a more important role in the integrity
of some ecosystems than [] do bears and wolves." Id.
165. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 86, at 117 (noting that a uniform regulatory system acting
across state lines is "bad policy because of demographic variation, localized culture, differing
geography, varied economic strengths, and limited federal resources"). Such an argument undercuts
the assertion that, in the absence of the ESA, states would continue to protect endangered species
just as they had enacted strict regulations in the aftermath of the SWANCC decision. See supranote
151 and accompanying text. This widespread variation in species' protection serves to bolster the
race
to the bottom argument that Wood had earlier stated was "unfounded." See id. at 115.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/4
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The Supreme Court, through its Lopez and Morrison decisions, has
emphatically shown that there are limits to congressional Commerce
Clause powers. 166 Utilizing the logic of the Fifth Circuit, it would appear
that the ESA does not fall outside of this scope; for if we aggregate the
takings of endangered species, there is a clear effect on interstate
commerce. 167 Such a view would protect all of Florida's species, from the
Florida panther to the salt marsh vole, regardless of their immediate
commercial influence. Furthermore, a resolution to the question of the
ESA's constitutionality benefits all parties, as the recent constitutional
challenges have sidetracked meaningful conversation about potential
reforms that could increase the chances for the recovery of endangered
species, while also respecting the legitimate concerns of landowners in
fast-developing communities.

166. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (discussing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
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